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UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE: PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURE
STANLEY D. METZGER*
0 NE OF THE HOPEFUL aspects of.the recent Presidential cam-
paign was the wide measure of agreement in principle among
the major candidates on the subject of American foreign trade. Both
candidates were for greater trade - not more import restrictions.
Those who are addicted to the principles which have underlain the
foreign trade policies of the United States since World War II can
draw some comfort from this performance. But those who also think
that the United States needs to do more to foster foreign trade in
tle next ten years than it has in the past would be foolhardy to draw
too much comfort from the past, including the recent campaign. The
forces which underlie protectionism and isolationism have not dissi-
pated; protectionism particularly has gathered strength in recent years;
and the difficult period which we are entering will be a serious test.
As always, some appreciation of our past is necessary to see where
we are and to place the future in perspective.
The foreign trade of the United States - our exports and im-
ports - is part of our domestic economy and part of our foreign
policy. Our foreign trade policy must therefore make sense in terms
of the stability and growth of our domestic economy and our standard
of living. It must also support and foster our efforts to be secure in
a world which must develop in freedom in order to meet the needs
and aspirations of its people.
In the 19th Century, when the United States was pursuing a
foreign policy of isolationism, when it was seeking to develop a new
continent free from economic or political interference from abroad, it
was understandable that a policy of self-sufficiency was thought possible
and even desirable despite its economic costs. But by the turn of the
century, and especially by the time World War I approached, this
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; formerly Assistant
Legal Advisor (for Economic Affairs), Department of State.
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policy of economic autarchy - importing only products we did not
produce, and exporting only surpluses - was outdated from every
point of view.
Our domestic economy was no longer a group of infant industries
which could not stand competition. On the contrary, the Sherman
Act,' enacted in 1890, had established a general national policy against
monopolies and in favor of competition free from artificial restraints
such as price-fixing and division of markets. This policy was adopted
because, economically, we had decided in favor of an expanding
economy producing better goods at lower prices, which meant rising
standards of living for our people, and against monopolies and re-
straints which meant lower living standards. The policy of compe-
tition had another domestic purpose, a political purpose in the highest
sense of the term. Recognizing that there was a close relationship be-
tween economic power and political power, and determined to pre-
serve and improve our democratic political system, the people of the
United States set their face against monopoly because a monopoly of
economic power could directly and indirectly undermine our demo-
cratic system.
Economic isolationism was also outdated in terms of our foreign
trade itself. Our agricultural and manufacturing production had grown
so great that we needed export markets. Our domestic standards
of life had improved to such an extent that we needed more, and a
greater variety of, imports. Since we could not export to countries
which could not earn enough from our imports to pay for them, and
we ourselves needed to export in order to earn enough to pay for our
imports, it was in the mutual interest of the United States and its
trading partners to accept more imports from one another and to
export more of the goods each could produce more economically. The
natural outcome of this mutuality of interest was a policy which
favored lower tariffs, fewer quotas and other import restrictions, and
nondiscrimination in the treatment of imports from the group of
countries comprising the world trading system.
This was the logical system, but it was extremely difficult to bring
about. It was in 1916 that Congressman Cordell Hull introduced a
bill having for its purpose the mutual reduction of excessive tariffs
and other import restrictions by the United States and its trading
partners, but it was not until 1934 that the Roosevelt Administration
succeeded in securing the enactment of the Trade Agreements Act.2
1. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958).
2. Trade Agreements Act §§ 1-4, 48 Stat. 943 (1934), 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1354(1958).
[VOL. 6: p. 503
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In the meantime, United States tariffs had been pushed to the
highest levels in history, in the Fordney-McCumber Act of 1922' and
the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930.' This Smoot-Hawley Act resulted
in protests from 34 countries. "By offending nearly every important
country in the world, it played its part in destroying whatever little
amity and good will among nations there was left,"5 according to the
historian Carl Becker. A thousand American economists, lead by Paul
H. Douglas, now the distinguished Senator from Illinois, had also
protested the measure, but President Hoover signed it, even though he
could not plead ignorance of the probable consequences.
Nor were the warnings of the economists or the 34 protests from
as many countries academic in character. As Cordell Hull stated in
his Memoirs, these countries, "Goaded by what they regarded as
almost an embargo keeping out their exports to the United States ...
retaliated in kind."6 In one year, for example, Switzerland's exports
to the United States fell off 30.5 per cent as compared to a general de-
cline of her exports of 11 per cent; her imports from the United States
decreased 29.6 per cent compared with a decrease of 5.4 per cent in
her imports from all countries. The British enacted a high tariff act
in 1931 and followed up by establishing in the Ottawa Agreements
of 1932 a tariff preference wall around the Commonwealth. The share
of the United States in the world's foreign trade fell by almost 30 per
cent from 1929 to 1933."
There could have been no more graphic illustration of the futility
and danger of a policy of economic isolationism than the results of the
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. There could have been no more vivid proof
that in an interdependent world a policy of "begger-thy-neighbor"
was disastrous to all neighbors.
Nor were high tariffs the only barrier erected. In an effort to
insulate themselves from economic depression, and to capture dwindling
markets from competitors, foreign nations applied on a wider scale
than ever before the most effective device yet invented to diminish
trade - the quantitative restriction on imports, and engaged in wide-
spread bilateral barter arrangements, with distortions and uneconomic
prices which are practically inherent in that method of trade.
This period also witnessed the last departures from a universal
standard of exchange, and fiscal and monetary measures which matched
3. 42 Stat. 858 (1922).
4. 46 Stat. 590 (1930).
5. BECK4R, How Ntw WILL THE BETTER WORLD B 220 (1944).
6. HULL, THE MEMOIRS OP CORDMLL HULL 355 (1948).
7. Id. at 355-56.
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the introversion of the trade measures which had been adopted by the
major participants in international trade. Competitive devaluations of
currency, and the imposition of stringent exchange controls over
current transactions as well as capital transfers, paralleled the restric-
tive measures in the field of trade. To these-were added, partly in aid
of barter arrangements, a wide variety of multiple currency practices,
so that, in terms of world trade, it was impossible in many instances to
determine the value of a unit of currency.
In every country there were groups which believed in and were
intent upon lifting prices, increasing employment, and otherwise re-
storing domestic trade and industry by domestic measures, and favored
import embargoes and higher tariffs to keep out imports which might
undercut the increased prices. In almost every country, these groups
were beset by others who, while fully cognizant of the need for do-
mestic measures, believed in calling a halt to the ever-increasing
barriers to trade, and reversing direction in the interest of expansion
of world trade, which they considered to be an indispensable element
in the revival of the world's economy. Almost every country possessed
counterparts of Moley and Peek on the one hand, and of Hull on the
other, and Chief Executives who vacillated between them and steered an
uneven course over the shoals.
The tide turned in 1934, the year of the Trade Agreements Act.
By then it had been made clear that the Tariff Act of 1930 and the
events which had ensued were an inadequate answer to the needs of
the American people as a whole. The Trade Agreements Act authorized
the President to enter into foreign trade agreements for the purpose
of expanding American exports, on a reciprocal basis, that is to say, by
offering to open the American market to greater amounts of imports.
Specifically, he was authorized to reduce then-existing tariff rates by
up to 50 per cent in exchange for compensatory concessions, and to
protect the concessions thus received from nullification or impair-
ment.8 From 1934 through World War II the United States entered
into bilateral trade agreements with twenty-nine countries, involving
tariff concessions and a set of trade rules which protected those con-
cessions from nullification by such devices as discriminatory internal
taxes on imported products which were not applied to the nationally-
produced article.9 In 1947 these were consolidated and refined, in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.'
8. 48 Stat. 943 (1934).
9. Sub-Committee on Customs, Tariff and Reciprocal Trade Agreements, Report
to the Committee on Ways and Means on United States Customs, Tariff, and Trade
Agreement Laws and Their Administration 30 (1957).
10. 61 Stat. 716 (1947), 19 U.S.C. § 1201 (1958).
[VOL. 6: p. 503
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The Trade Agreements Program was important as much for what
it meant in stopping deterioration in cross-boundary economic relations
as for its positive accomplishments during the pre-war period. The
trade rules in the bilaterals significantly did not outlaw generally the
import quota (neither the United States nor foreign countries would
go so far), although they did set forth the rule of non-discrimination
in the application of tariff rates and in such matters as internal taxation.
No meaningful rules of the road regarding exchange controls as they
affected trade were established, although some agreements contained
various kinds of exchange control provisions.
In addition, after the failure of the London Economic Conference
in 1933, only limited efforts were made to create monetary stability on
an international basis, the United States' contribution being principally
the use of a rather small stabilization fund in assisting certain Latin-
American nations to stabilize their currency. No code of monetary
practices was negotiated, much less lived up to.
Nevertheless, by the time Hitler invaded Poland, an important
change had occurred, perhaps the most important of all - a change
in men's -minds, caused by their reflection on what had gone before
and their desire to avoid its repetition. Economic conditions had im-
proved, governments had grappled with the problems of the day, and
the philosophy of restrictive trade measures had been replaced by the
outgoing attitude reflected in the Trade Agreements program. Finally,
there was a growing realization, as Becker put it, that "if each country
goes on its own and on the loose in the effort to revive business pros-
perity at home and promote its foreign trade it will not succeed very
well in doing either.""
The post-war period, with the GATT, the International Bank,' 2
The Monetary Fund,'3 and the effort to create an International Trade
Organization,"4 saw a burgeoning of the effort to create one trading
world, along with the similar effort at San Francisco to create the
framework for one political world.
That this policy of freeing trade from artificial barriers was not
acquired without paying a price is, of course, fairly obvious. It can
hardly be otherwise in the legislative process, where it is rare that an
important interest is utterly defeated. When the trade agreements
program was put forward in 1934, it was made quite clear that it was
one of assisting American industry and agriculture, not injuring it.
11. BnCKR, op. cit. supra note 5, at 221.
12. 60 Stat. 1440 (1945).
13. 60 Stat. 1401 (1945).
14. U.S. DEFr. oV STATE, PUB. No. 3206, HAVANA CHARTER VOR AN INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION (1948).
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While the "no serious injury" concept was muted in the early years
of the program, it was never absent. And later it assumed major
proportions when first the Administration under protectionist pressure
created an "escape clause" procedure, and then the Congress itself in
1948 and 1951 wrote "peril points" and "escape clauses"1 into the
tariff negotiating procedure and the administrative framework of the
ensuing tariff-cutting agreements.
In addition to the intensification of the safeguards against injury
from tariff reductions represented by the peril points and escape clause
provisions, there was increasing difficulty in persuading Congress to
grant additional tariff-cutting authority. The high-water mark was
the 1945 Extension of the Trade Agreements Act, 6 which granted
authority to reduce tariffs by up to 50 percent of the rates in effect
in 1945, a considerable addition to the original grant of authority to
reduce by 50 per cent the 1934 rates. Since 1945, the additional
authority has been modest indeed - 15 per cent tariff-cutting authority
15. The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 §§ 3-4, 65 Stat. 72 (1951),
as amended, 72 Stat. 675 (1958), 19 U.S.C. §§ 1360-1361 (1958), sets forth the
"peril points" procedures. Sections 6-8 of the Act, 65 Stat. 73 (1951), as amended,
69 Stat. 165 (1955), 19 U.S.C. §§ 1363-1365 (1958), set out the "escape clause"
procedures.
Briefly, as to "peril points" procedures: before entering upon negotiations with
foreign countries for reciprocal tariff reductions, a list is made up of articles con-
sidered for possible "modification of duties and other import restrictions" and
published; the Tariff Commission investigates and makes a report to the President
on each such article as to the limit to which such modification may be made "without
causing or threatening serious injury to the domestic industry producing like or
directly competitive articles." In subsequent negotiations the President may "breach"
these "peril points", but if he does he must report why he has done so to the
Congress.
If the existing tariff duty on a listed article which has already been the
subject of a trade agreement concession is found by the Tariff Commission to be
below the "peril point" for the article, (a) the Tariff Commission must immediately
institute an "escape clause" proceeding with respect to such article, and (b) the
President must report to the Congress why the trade agreement which is there-
after negotiated does not provide for modification of the duty to the recommended
"peril point."
As to "escape clause" procedures: If a concession has been made in a trade
agreement upon a product, any "interested party" (or the President, or either House
of Congress, or either the House Ways and Means Committee or the Senate Finance
Committee, or the Tariff Commission on its own motion) may apply to the Tariff
Commission for an investigation and then the Commission must investigate, to de-
termine whether the product is, as a result, in whole or in part, of the duty or
other customs treatment reflecting such concession, being imported into the United
States in such increased quantities, either actual or relative, as to cause or threaten
serious injury to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive prod-
ucts. The Tariff Commission reports the results of its investigation to the President
and its recommendations. If it finds that relief is warranted, these recommendations
may be withdrawal or "modification" of the concession, in whole or in part, or the
establishment of import quotas, to the extent and for the time necessary to prevent or
remedy such injury. The President may reject the findings, or the recommendations
in whole or in part, but if he does he must report to the House Ways and Means
Committee and to the Senate Finance Committee the reasons for his action.
16. 59 Stat. 410 (1945).
[VOtL. 6: p. 503
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in the 1955 Act,17 spread over three years, and 20 per cent in the 1958
Act,18 which in fact will be spread over a greater period.
Until 1960-1961 the effect of the intensification of safeguards
against injury has been more psychological than real. It is true that
peril points have not been breached - as they can be legally.' 9 But
the product-by-product listing practice approved by Congress20 and the
naturally cautious approach of a Tariff Commission whose sensitive
antennae catch protectionist murmurings before they reach high dec-
ible proportions has been offset to some extent in that up to now there
has been sufficient water in the rates to permit a quite respectable
showing by the United States in negotiations.
The same is true of the escape clause. While the record in the
past ten years shows watches, bicycles, and lead and zinc securing
escape clause relief; so-called "voluntary" action by foreign countries
limiting their exports to the United States of textiles, flatware and
other products; and oil import restrictions imposed because of sup-
posed "national security" reasons, the resistance by successive Ad-
ministrations to higher duties and quotas on trade agreement items
has ranged from moderate to stout, and, trade-wise, only lead and
zinc and oil can be called relatively major in proportions.
This respectable if not precisely heart-warming performance in
the administration of safeguards which were more or less forced
upon the Administration by protectionist pressures, must however
be viewed against a background of very modest forward movement
and, what may be most important, the almost complete discounting
by our trading partners of our ability to maintain important momentum
toward further meaningful reductions in trade barriers. More than
anything else, the defeat of the ITO Charter in the United States
in 1948-1949 convinced Europeans, especially, that our high-water
mark in reducing trade barriers had been reached, and that while they
might reasonably expect a stiff rear-guard action by us against efforts
to erode seriously the gains made, it would be unreal to look for much
more than token advances. They could expect, and would get, rhetoric,
and perhaps enough by way of future tariff negotiations to keep the
franchise of a Trade Agreements Program, but not really much more.
17. 69 Stat. 162 (1955).
18. 72 Stat. 673 (1958).
19. See note 15 supra.
20. The detailed procedure followed in trade agreement negotiations was spelled
out by the Administration in writing, and was included as appendices to the House
Ways and Means reports on the bills which became the 1955 and 1958 Trade
Agreements Extension Acts. See H.R. RRP. No. 1761, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 129-35(1958) ; H.R. lP. No. 50, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 81-86 (1955).
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In short, after 1949 the Trade Agreements Program did not hold
out to them the prospects of a further major advance into the United
States market. In fact, as events have shown, they underestimated
their own growth prospects, and our ability to contain our periodic
recessions. But that they had respectable grounds for their beliefs,
although perhaps prematurely so, it would be difficult to deny. At any
rate, it was such an analysis on their part that probably had more to do
than any other single factor - with the possible exception of the de-
sire from Franco-German rapproachement - with the movement
toward the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community
and the European Common Market. The hopes for one trading
world, like those for one political world, having been seriously
dampened, the avenue of regionalism, with all its known pitfalls,
beckoned. In economic terms, the possibilities of a wider European
market overcame the known trade-diverting effects of such a market21
because of the very uncertain prospects for significant gains in the
American market, and the European countries' desire to insulate them-
selves as much as possible from the effects of possible, if not probable,
United States depressions.
Nor was the United States in a strong position to gainsay the
choice, even had it wished to repeat its antagonism of World War I
years to European preferential arrangements.2" Apart from the
political attractiveness of Franco-German cooperation in the face
of growing Soviet power, the United States was hardly able to hold
out the prospect between 1949 and 1955 of further substantial opening
of the American market. And when the United States was only able
to secure with difficulty 15 per cent authority in 1955, and then
utilized only a little over 4 per cent tariff-cutting authority in the 1955
negotiations, it was quite clear that the momentum of the program
was gone.
The 1958 Extension of the Trade Agreements program was pre-
sented to the Congress as essentially a defensive move. Twenty-five
per cent tariff-cutting authority was requested23 - 20 per cent was
granted - in order to be able to secure comparable reductions in the
Common Market's external tariff so as to lessen the trade-diverting
effects of the Common Market - in order to reduce, not eliminate, the
discrimination against American exports, and hence, in order to pro-
tect American exports to the Common Market from a serious cutback.
21. See Metzger, Regional Markets and International Law, PROCEEDINGS, AMER.
Soc. INT'L LAW 169, 172-73 (1960).
22. See VINSR, THI CUSTOMS UNION IssuE 24-25 (1950).
23. H.R. REP. 10368, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
[VOL. 6: p. 503
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We are now preparing to negotiate upon the basis of the 1958
Act. With so many soft spots in our economy, with rising pro-
tectionist sentiment, with what has been reported to be extremely
difficult "peril points," with little water left to be squeezed out of the
tariff rates on items which have survived "peril points," it would be
foolhardy to expect that our product-by-product listing and peril point
process will permit this negotiation to be of major significance in
itself. It is likely that we will be able in the end to utilize, at most,
half of our 20 per cent authority and it will be a surprise if the
cuts are in the areas of greatest interest to our trading partners. It
may nevertheless be expected that the Common Market will do some-
what better on their side, since they must know that unless they do,
our agricultural interests and perhaps others might compel retrogressive
action here which would be harmful to their interests and ours.
If we are permitted to look beyond the 1961 Tariff negotiations,
trusting that we shall have achieved something of a holding position,
where will we be? We will be before the Congress with a 1962 Trade
Agreement Extension Bill, at a time when the completion of the
Common Market is within sight - when the last of the cuts in the
respective internal tariffs will be four to five years away; when in all
likelihood a variety of special agricultural agreements will have further
complicated our exports to the Market; and when, perhaps, still
further special arrangements are made with the Outer Seven which
we shall have been able, with luck, to influence so as to curtail their
adverse effect upon our exports.
The 1962 Extension will thus be the next great watershed in our
trade policy. If our domestic economy does not improve substantially
over what it has been this past year; if our balance of payments does not
materially improve; in short, if our economic situation remains about
what it is now, the prospects are ominous. Even if our economy moves
upward, the problem of resuming momentum in our trade policy will
be serious; but without a reversal in the economic trend, it is very
doubtful that a meaningful extension of the Trade Agreements Pro-
gram can be secured from Congress.
But assuming that the Administration is in a position to go be-
fore Congress with a fair chance of securing a good program, what
should it want?
There are some advocates of a liberal foreign trade policy who
believe that we must eliminate peril points, eliminate product-by-product
listing and bargaining, and secure sufficient tariff-cutting authority
to match the remaining internal tariff removal within the Common
Market - that is to say, secure a five-year renewal with 50 per cent
SUMMER 1961]
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authority, and authority to bargain in broad tariff categories without
limitation because of an advance judgment that reductions will injure
domestically-produced articles. Only in this way, they say, could there
be sufficient interest on the part of foreigners to warrant another tariff-
cutting round. Others would add to this prescription the elimination
of the escape clause. And still others believe that an even more am-
bitious undertaking must be set afoot - a North Atlantic economic
union sounding in the eventual elimination of all trade barriers within
a defined geographic area, but whose specifics have not been spelled out.
Then there are those who would in effect end the program, and
accept the political divisions within the free world and the other conse-
quences that would ensue from the gradual closing of markets within
inward-looking regional groupings. That this protectionist prescrip-
tion, or action tending toward it, is unpalatable to the writer goes
without saying.
However, as to the first, more outward-looking program, there
are also deficiencies, largely as a consequence of its overly ambitious
qualities. All countries have adopted the injury concept, and it seems
quite unreal to expect any to give it up. Any effort to eliminate the
escape clause therefore appears to be a hopeless non-starter; in fact,
the performance of the Tariff Commission during the past year has
been quite responsible, which may be another way of saying that its
reports justifying its many refusals to recommend escape clause relief
sound sensible.
It is also extremely doubtful that peril points can be eliminated.
The "peril point" conception was formulated in order to provide an
additional "preventative" safeguard against injury to domestic in-
dustry, which had complained that "escape clause" relief came much
later, if at all, after an injury had already occurred. At a time, 1962,
when by all prognoses there will still be a substantial number of unem-
ployed persons in the United States, it is simply idle to imagine that
the forces which had the strength to secure the enactment of the
"peril point" procedure will not be able to muster the lesser strength
that is needed to maintain the existing procedure.
But there is considerable merit in category by category listing and
bargaining, and a way to utilize peril-pointing so as not to imperil
meaningful bargaining. If negotiations were to aim at an overall per-
centage reduction in the external tariffs of the various countries, to
be derived from groups of related tariff items of interest, it should be
possible to make an agreement, conditional upon adjustments being
made to make up any shortfall resulting from post-negotiation peril-
[VOL. 6: p. 503
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pointing. This peril-pointing could continue to be on a product-by-
product basis after negotiation of the conditional agreement. If, for
example, we should seek a five-year, 50 per cent extension authority
and set as our negotiating goal that figure, to be achieved by the
end of the period, peril-pointing would begin after a negotiation re-
sulting, let us assume, in a conditionally-agreed 35-40 per cent round-
robin reduction, in broad tariff categories. Peril-pointing might then
result in a 5 per cent overall reduction in this figure, in which case
the other nations could opt to reduce, in mutually-agreed categories,
proportionately. Actual reductions would still be proclaimed indi-
vidually.
This proposal, which is similar to one proposed by the French
some years ago, would certainly not be easy of acceptance by the
Congress. But its economic appeal to our trading partners would be
substantial, its approval would be a signal of regained momentum in
our trade policy, and its effect upon those who see portents of United
States withdrawal beneath our staunchest words would be significant.
These objectives are important to the successful conduct of foreign re-
lations. On the other hand, the injury concept would remain, albeit
with the emphasis upon agreement to reduce, not refusal to negotiate;
the escape clause would still enable those who can prove that injury
has occurred to secure relief; and a Trade Adjustment Program, 24 such
as the one first introduced in the Senate in 1954 by then Senator
Kennedy, could be added to the available remedies for industries found
to have been injured as a consequence of imports.
Such a program could regain forward movement toward reduction
of trade barriers. It would of course not have startling results. But it
would again pry open the door looking toward that one trading free
world which, however distant, still beckons, if only because others have
such obvious defects.
24. Such a program envisages that if a domestic industry demonstrates in an
escape clause proceeding that it is being injured as a result of imports which have
increased, the President would be able to give relief to the industry through small-
business loans, retraining and earlier retirement benefits under Social Security for
displaced workers, etc., instead of or in combination with import restrictions.
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